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THIRD-PARTY HARMS, CONGRESSIONAL STATUTES ACCOMMODATING
RELIGION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

QUESTION PRESENTED
Those disappointed with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), are seeking ways to otherwise limit the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting
in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790 n.8, 2802 n.25 (2014), wrote that when a
statute seeks to accommodate a claimant’s religious beliefs or practices there must
be no detrimental effect on third parties who do not share those beliefs. Although it
is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg was relying on the Establishment Clause as
imposing this categorical restraint on the authority of Congress,1 some commentators
argue that her thinking necessarily rests on the Establishment Clause.2 It is of some
importance whether these commentators are correct about the rule of third-party
harm being derived from the Establishment Clause. Although Justice Samuel Alito
for the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby squarely rejected the argument that thirdparty harms categorically defeat requests for accommodations under RFRA, id. at
2781 n.37, he did not consider the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Government
did not argue it. So these commentators promoting the third-party harm rule are able
to maintain that nothing in Hobby Lobby contradicts their reliance on the
Establishment Clause. The commentators would, of course, like to have Justice
Ginsburg on their side. In her recent concurrence in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853,
867 (2015), Justice Ginsburg reiterated her view that substantial third-party harms
were a categorical limitation on statutory religious accommodations, but she did not
clarify if her rule was derived from the Establishment Clause or was otherwise a
limitation implicit in the statutory claim.
Is Congress’s authority to accommodate a religious belief or practice
constrained by the Establishment Clause, which is said by some commentators to
require the government to always refrain from granting a statutory exemption if it
would cause harm to third parties who do not share that belief?

See Kevin Walsh, Did Justice Ginsburg endorse the Establishment Clause third-party burdens
argument in Holt v. Hobbs?, http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/01/did-justiceginsburg-endorse-the-establishment-clause-third-party-burdens-argument-in-holt-v-hobbs-.html.
2
See M. Schwartzman, R. Schragger & N. Tebbe, Holt v. Hobbs and Third Party Harms,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-hobbs-and-third-party-harms.html.
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SUMMARY OF POINTS DISCUSSED
1. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a regulation or tax imposes
a burden on a religious practice of an individual or organization, it is free to lift that
burden by providing an exemption. This is what Congress has done in adopting RFRA
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). To exempt
religious exercise from a regulatory or tax burden has the effect of leaving religion
alone. And for the government to leave religion alone does not establish a religion.
In a long list of the Supreme Court’s cases there has been a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statutory religious exemption. The Court has consistently
rejected the argument that a religious exemption is violative the Establishment
Clause. Only in one such case has the Establishment Clause said to have been
violated, namely Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The statute
in Caldor, however, was singular in that it created an “unyielding” preference for a
particular religious observance, Sabbath rest, and thereby completely disregarded
the costs borne by others. RFRA and RLUIPA are not unyielding but operate in a
manner that accounts for the circumstances of others. These two statutes require
officials to engage in case-specific interest balancing. Any costs falling on third parties
are weighed in the balance, along with other relevant considerations, all as
prescribed, before a determination is made whether to allow the religious
accommodation. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. RFRA and RLUIPA do not
violate the Establishment Clause.
2. Prerequisite to the operation of any rule of third-party harm is a showing that the
accommodation of a given religious observance or practice actually causes a harm to
fall on others. For example, under the Affordable Care Act, effective January 1, 2013,
the Government imposed a regulatory burden on employers of more than fifty
persons, and it conferred a corresponding benefit on their employees. In Hobby Lobby,
two of those employers invoked RFRA seeking an accommodation. RFRA kept the
burden from falling on the employers and thereby kept the benefit vesting in certain
employees. The effect of the two governmental actions was no net change for anyone,
economically or religiously. The employers and employees are back to where they
started. To consider one of these actions without considering the other, as some
commentators do,3 is to ignore the full context in which the dispute arose. This is the
baseline problem of measuring burdens/benefits under the Establishment Clause. In
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the proper baseline
to measure burden/benefit is just before the effective date of the initial regulation. By
that measure, in Hobby Lobby there was never a “benefit” vested in the employees
that was later “taken away” by the operation of RFRA.

See N. Tebbe, R. Schragger & M. Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part
II: What Counts As A Burden on Employees?, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-andestablishment-clause.html.
3
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3. Proponents of a third-party harm rule concede that the Establishment Clause is
structural in nature.4 Rather than operating as an individual right which is subject
to balancing, the Constitution’s structural provisions operate to distribute and
delimit the powers and duties of a government of limited, delegated powers. Familiar
structural limits are separation of powers and federalism. By its terms, the
Establishment Clause acts as a denial of power, otherwise vested in Congress, to
“make . . . law respecting an establishment of religion.” Structural limits, when
applicable, are categorical, such as the limits on a federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. A federal court either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not; there
is no balancing between competing interests. In like manner, the Establishment
Clause is regarded by the federal judiciary as categorical in its operation, separating
church and government. Either the church-state boundary is violated or it is not.
There is no such thing as a balancing test with the Establishment Clause. Yet a rule
based on the substantiality of third-party harms necessitates such talk by its
proponents. Such harms might be a little incurred or greatly incurred, small injuries
or big injuries, substantial or trivial in the burden to be borne. Injuries of this sort
are in the nature of those protected by an individual rights clause, not injuries
safeguarded by a structural restraint such as the Establishment Clause.
DISCUSSION
Point One: For Government to leave religion alone is not to establish a
religion.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that when a government
regulation or tax imposes a burden on a religious observance or practice of an
individual or organization, it is free to lift that burden by providing a religious
exemption. This is what Congress has done in adopting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. To
exempt religious exercise from a regulatory or tax burden has the effect of leaving
religion alone. And for the government to leave religion alone is not to establish a
religion.
The leading case is Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987), in which the Court upheld a statutory exemption in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012), that permits religious organizations
to prefer employees of like-minded faith. 483 U.S. at 332 n.9. Mayson, a building
custodian employed at a gymnasium operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, was discharged when he ceased to be a church member in good
standing. The Court began by reaffirming that the Establishment Clause did not
mean that government must be indifferent to religion, but aims at government not
“act[ing] with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.”
See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 347
(2014).
4
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Id. at 335. The Title VII exemption, however, was not an instance of government
“abandoning neutrality,” for “it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate” a
regulatory burden leaving religious organizations free “to define and carry out their
religious missions,” as they see fit. Id.
In addition to Amos, the Court has on five other occasions turned back an
Establishment Clause challenge to a religious exemption. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709 (2005) (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which
accommodates religious observance by prison inmates, does not violate
Establishment Clause); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (religious
exemption from military draft for those opposing all war does not violate
Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax
exemptions for religious organizations do not violate Establishment Clause); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (local public school district’s release of students from
state compulsory education law to enable them to attend religion classes off the public
school grounds does not violate Establishment Clause); The Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military draft exemption for clergy, seminarians, and
pacifists does not violate Establishment Clause).
A. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor is Distinguishable.
In only one of the Court’s religious exemption cases has a shift in burden been
a factor in determining that the Establishment Clause was violated, namely Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). But Caldor entailed a unique
accommodation that was unlike anything in RFRA or RLUIPA.
In Caldor, Connecticut had amended its laws to permit more retail stores to be
open on Sunday. Out of concern for those who would now be pressured to work on
their Sabbath, the state adopted a law to help employees who desired to remain
observant. The statute read: “No person who states that a particular day of the week
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.” Id.
at 706. Donald Thornton was an employee for Caldor, Inc., a department store. He
was a Presbyterian and observed Sunday as his Sabbath. When Caldor Department
Stores began opening on Sunday, Thornton worked Sundays once or twice a month.
He later invoked the Connecticut statute seeking no work on Sunday. Caldor resisted
and a lawsuit was filed on Thornton’s behalf by the State Board of Mediation. Id. at
705-07. Caldor argued that the Connecticut statute violated the Establishment
Clause, and the Court agreed. Id. at 707, 710-11.
The Court in Caldor noted that the “statute arms Sabbath observers with an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designated as their
Sabbath.” Id. at 709 (footnote omitted). The statute failed to account for what an
employer was to do “if a high percentage of an employer’s workforce asserts rights to
the same Sabbath.” Id. The law also granted an “unyielding weighting in favor of
Sabbath observers over all other interests.” Id. at 710. For example, coworkers with
more seniority may want weekends off because those are the same days a spouse is
not working. Id. at 710 n.9. All this was problematic “[u]nder the Religion Clauses,”
5

the Court reasoned, not because of cost-shifting, but because “government . . . must
take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any religion.” Id. at 708. It was
not the business expense as such, but that Caldor and other employees were being
compelled to act in the name of Thornton’s conviction about keeping the Sabbath holy.
The Court also noted that Thornton’s religious burden was caused by the
demands of the private retail sector. The Connecticut law, in response to the
anticipated employee demands, empowered Thornton to call on the state’s assistance
to secure the observance of his Sabbath. Id. at 709. Caldor is thus unlike Amos, the
latter being an exemption that merely lifted a government burden that was imposed
by that same government. The Connecticut statute, in contrast, spurred government
into taking a side as between two private-sector disputants. It did so by arming
Thornton with an affirmative legal right against others in the private sector.
It was in this context that the Court in Caldor said “a fundamental principle
of the Religion Clauses” is that the First Amendment “gives no one the right to insist
that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own
religious necessities.” Id. at 710 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Clarification concerning limits on reach of this announced “fundamental principle”
was needed and quickly came in two cases decided in the next two years.5
The first was Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987). Hobbie was the third occasion for the Court to rule on the application of the
Free Exercise Clause to an employee seeking benefits under a state’s unemployment
compensation law.6 On each of these occasions, the state had denied benefits because
the worker declined to take a job for which she was qualified. In Hobbie, the employee
was discharged when she refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.
In reliance on Caldor’s “fundamental principle,” the employer in Hobbie argued
that to compel accommodation of an employee’s Sabbath entailed a shift in burden to
the employer and coworkers contrary to the Establishment Clause. Id. at 145. The
Court not only rejected the employer’s argument, but began to cabin Caldor’s socalled “fundamental principle”:
In Thornton [v. Caldor], we . . . determined that the State’s “unyielding
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests . . . ha[d]
a primary effect that impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious
practice,” . . . and placed an unacceptable burden on employers and coworkers because it provided no exceptions for special circumstances
regardless of the hardship resulting from the mandatory
accommodation.
It is not even clear whether the Caldor Court was attributing this “fundamental principle” to the
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. If the attribution was to the Free Exercise Clause,
then the passage is simply irrelevant to the argument here that no-establishment principles are
implicated.
6
The prior two cases were Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5
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Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11 (internal citations omitted; brackets in original). Hobbie
showed how narrow Caldor was. In lifting a religious burden, the statutory
accommodation in Caldor favored the religious claimant unyieldingly or was
absolute, thus entirely disregarding the interests of the employer and coworkers.
That is not the case with RFRA/RLUIPA, which entail a balancing test familiar to
free exercise law that takes into account the interests of others.
A few months later, the Amos Court also addressed the scope of the
“fundamental principle” passage in Caldor. In Amos, a religious exemption in Title
VII permitted religious organizations to prefer those of like-minded faith in
employment. Mayson, a building custodian, claimed the statutory exemption shifted
a burden to him resulting in loss of employment. Tracking the Caldor passage,
Mayson argued that the exemption pressured him to conform his conduct to the
religious necessities of others contrary to the Establishment Clause. The High Court
disagreed:
This is a very different case than Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. . . . .
In Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting an
employer from requiring an employee to work on a day designated by
the employee as his Sabbath. In effect, Connecticut had given the force
of law to the employee’s designation of a Sabbath day and required
accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden which that
constituted for the employer or other employees. See Hobbie . . . 480 U.S.
[at] 145 n.11.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15. The Court thus distinguished Caldor from Amos, and the
issue raise by RFRA/RLUIPA is like that in Amos. The statute in Caldor favored the
religious claimant absolutely, thus totally disregarding the interests of others in the
private sector. As stated above in the context of Hobbie, RFRA/RLUIPA is not
unyielding but requires interest balancing.
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), the religious exemption was by
operation of RLUIPA at a state correctional facility. Justice Ginsburg writing for the
Court said that given RLUIPA’s “tak[ing] adequate account of the burdens [that] a
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,” the statute met the
strictures of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 720. Because RLUIPA was not
unyielding to third-party considerations, a unanimous Court upheld its
constitutionality.
In the Supreme Court’s penultimate encounter with RFRA, the government
argued that it had satisfied its burden under the compelling interest test by claiming
there was a need for uniform application of a controlled substances statute. See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36
(2006). That argument was rejected because that is not how RFRA operates. Rather,
under RFRA the judiciary is charged with striking “sensible balances” that often lead
to religious accommodations. RFRA assumes “the feasibility of case-by-case
consideration of religious exemptions.” Id. at 436 (referencing Cutter). And both
7

RLUIPA in Cutter and RFRA in O Centro avoided implicating the Establishment
Clause by their case-by-case interest balancing, as opposed to the “unyielding”
preference statute struck down in Caldor.
From Hobbie, Amos, Cutter, and O Centro we have the factor that sets Caldor
apart. The religious exemption in Caldor created an “unyielding” preference for a
religious observance particular to some religions: Sabbath rest. RFRA/RLUIPA
creates no absolute preference for religion, but sets up the familiar interest-balancing
calculus of free exercise law. Accordingly, the Establishment Clause is not remotely
triggered by the appearance or reality of third-party harms due to the operation
RFRA or RLUIPA.
B. Hobby Lobby footnote 37 and the rule of third-party harms.
In Hobby Lobby, the Government did not argue that RFRA, as applied, violated
the Establishment Clause because it imposed third-party harm on some of the
employees of Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties. However, the
Government did make a parallel argument, to wit: That a burden on third parties,
who did not share the religious beliefs of the RFRA claimants, categorically tipped
the statute’s prescribed interest balancing against the employers. The Court
thoroughly rejected that argument:
[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on religious
exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the
government interest could be achieved through alternative means, is
permissible under RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation requires
the religious adherent to confer a benefit on third parties.
134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. The Court went on to point out how easily the third-party
harm argument is concocted:
By framing any Government regulation as benefitting a third party, the
Government could turn all regulations into entitlements to which
nobody could object on religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless.
Id. The Government’s categorical third-party burden argument, reject in Hobby
Lobby, is nearly identical to the argument that the Establishment Clause is violated
in the face of third-party harm. Having stiff-armed one such argument, we can safely
predict the Court would do the same with the one under discussion here.

Point Two: The Baseline for Measuring Third-Party Harms.
Before asking if RFRA/RLUIPA impose a burden on third parties who do not
share the same religious beliefs as the one claiming an accommodation, a prerequisite
is that these third parties had a vested interest in the status or entitlement which
they claim is now being “taken away” or harmed.
8

Hobby Lobby provides a useful context. Under the Affordable Care Act,
effective January 1, 2013, the government imposed a regulatory burden on employers
of more than fifty persons, and it conferred a corresponding health-care benefit on
their employees. If Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties now invoke
RFRA seeking an accommodation, it prevents the burden from falling on these
employers and keeps the benefit from reaching their employees. The net effect of the
two governmental actions is no change for anyone, economically or religiously. The
employers and employees are back to where they started. To consider one of these
actions without considering the other is to ignore the context in which the dispute
arose. If the Government in Hobby Lobby had argued the Establishment Clause, the
baseline for measuring the relevant burdens/benefits is just before the effective date
of the ACA mandate.
In Hobby Lobby, the Government did not argue that imposing a “burden” on
third-party employees violated the Establishment Clause. That was wise because
given the baseline there was no “burden.” The Government also did not argue that
providing a RFRA accommodation to the employers was a religious preference
violative of the Establishment Clause. That too was wise because given the baseline
there was no employer “benefit.” For the Government to exempt religion while
imposing regulation on others similarly situated is to leave religion alone. And to
leave religion alone is not a benefit and thus not an establishment.
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra, note 4, at 371, claim that the controlling
baseline in Hobby Lobby should be 1993, which is just before RFRA was enacted by
Congress. But that choice is contrary to Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987). In Amos, the baseline was on the eve of the effective date of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 337 (“[W]e find no persuasive evidence in
the record before us that the Church’s ability to propagate its religious doctrine
through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act in 1964.”). This was the date just before a regulatory burden was
first imposed on religious employers like the LDS Church. Congress amended Title
VII in 1972, thereby lifting the relevant burden from religious employers. Id. at 332
n.9. Accordingly, the 1972 amendment is the counterpart to RFRA in Hobby Lobby.
Given the 1964 baseline used in Amos, the 1972 amendment was not a new “benefit”
but was merely returning the LDS Church to its prior unregulated status on the eve
of the 1964 Civil Rights Law.
In Amos, it was the 1972 amendment that was attacked as violative of the
Establishment Clause (id. at 335-37), and in Hobby Lobby it was RFRA that would
be subjected to an Establishment Clause challenge by Gedicks & Van Tassell. But
that is the wrong baseline. The ACA mandate of January 1, 2013, is the counterpart
to Title VII when first enacted in 1964. Both legislative acts (Title VII and ACA)
altered the status quo ante from no regulatory burden on employers to imposing such
a burden. So in a “before and after” comparison, the circumstances on the eve of the
2013 ACA mandate and the 1964 Title VII are the “before,” which is to say they are

9

the baseline for comparing later burdens/benefits. That was the approach of the Amos
Court, and the one that should be followed with RFRA/RLUIPA.
Other commentators argue that in setting the baseline the Court should
assume that health-care is universally available.7 (Universal coverage, of course, is
not the actual state of affairs under the ACA.) If we are to assume a world where the
default position is comprehensive health-care coverage, then it is a mere tautology
that departure from that baseline because of a RFRA accommodation for Hobby
Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties is a “burden” for their employees. This
assumption of universal health-care coverage for purposes of a baseline is, as
explained in the prior paragraph, contrary to Amos.
Why not assume a world where RFRA accommodations are universal? Then it
is a mere tautology that that there is no “burden” on the employees because status
quo ante is no health-care benefits. Indeed, we can make all sorts of fantasy
assumptions and draw the baseline accordingly. What these commentators have
forgotten is that the baseline is drawn to serve the principles of the Establishment
Clause. That is what guided the Court in Amos, and that is what should guide us
here. For government to leave religion alone is not to establish a religion.
Point Three: The Establishment Clause operates categorically, not
according to the balancing-of-interests invited by a rule of third-party
harms, thus suggesting that the Clause is not implicated.
Gedicks & Van Tassell concede that the Establishment Clause is “a structural
bar on government action rather than a guarantee of personal rights. [Thus,
v]iolations cannot be waived by the parties or balanced away by weightier private or
government interests, as can violations of the Free Exercise Clause.” Gedicks &
Tassell, supra note 4, at 347. They are right about that.8 However, they seem not to
realize that a structural Establishment Clause undermines their core thesis which is
that at some point the cost-shifting becomes so great that “the scales tip” against a
religious exemption’s validity under that Clause. Id. at 363-71. As if the case law
under the Establishment Clause was not complex enough, these commentators would
See N. Tebbe, R. Schragger & M. Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part
II: What Counts As A Burden on Employees? http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-andestablishment-clause.html
8
Unlike individual constitutional rights, such as free speech or free exercise, which are not
absolute but subject to balancing, the Establishment Clause has been applied like a structural clause
and thus operates categorically. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause
as a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J. LAW & POLITICS (UVA) 445 (2002).
When structural in nature the Establishment Clause negates power that otherwise might be thought
to have been delegated to government. By its terms, it denies to Congress power to “make . . . law
respecting an establishment,” thereby separating church and government. U.S. CONST. Amend. 1. As
with power-delegating and power-negating clauses in the Constitution, when the restraint on power
that is the Establishment Clause is exceeded there is no balancing. Either the government has
exceeded its power or it has not, much as with a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
7
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turn the Clause into an occasion for Lochner-era balancing of economic interests. Id.
at 375-78 (a little economic cost-shifting is constitutionally valid, but at some juncture
a Federal judge is to somehow know when too many dollars tote up to the “tipping
point” against RFRA).
In the few cases that have paid attention to burden shifting, such as Caldor,
the Court did so because the law in question granted an “unyielding weighting in
favor of [religious] observers over all other interests.” 472 U.S. at 710. And such a
shift in burden was problematic “[u]nder the Religion Clauses,” not because of the
total dollars involved in the shift, but because “government . . . must take pains not
to compel people to act in the name of any religion.” Id. at 708. So it was not the
money as such that is the relevant offense or harm, but that a private-sector
employer, a department store, was being compelled by the state to act in the name of
someone else’s religion. The Caldor Court thought that set of facts had the “primary
effect” of advancing “a particular religious practice.” Id. at 710. A party being
compelled by an unyielding law to act in the name of another’s religious creed does
actually have the ring of an Establishment Clause rule. It sounds like a fix rule; when
applicable it applies unyieldingly. It is something a categorical Establishment Clause
can, in the right case, get its teeth into, unlike the balancing test engaged in by
Gedicks & Van Tassell.
From the outset of the litigation over the contraceptive mandate, the
Government conceded that, due to the unassailable right to religious freedom,
churches and their integrated auxiliaries should be exempt from the mandate. But a
woman working for a church suffers the same unrealized-benefit “loss” as does a
woman working for Conestoga Wood Specialties or Hobby Lobby Stores.9 To avoid
that comparison, commentators pressed their argument hardest when it came to
business entities with many employees. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 4, at
380-82. But there is no principled basis for doing so. The issue is not how large is the
total dollar amount of a given shift in the cost of contraceptives, for the Establishment
Clause operates categorically rather than as a balancing test.
Under Point One, supra, there is collected six Supreme Court cases where a
religious accommodation by the Government was unsuccessfully attacked as a
“religious preference” violative of the Establishment Clause.10 Proponents of the
9

Gedicks & Van Tassell make the Establishment Clause claim that it would be unconstitutional
to exempt religious nonprofit and for-profit organizations, except for churches and their integrated
auxiliaries. See, supra, note 4 at 380-81. They want to avoid arguing that it is unconstitutional as to
churches, for that is too improbable. So they indulge in speculation about the contraceptive use by
employees of churches who teach that contraception, or emergency contraception, is morally
prohibited. Id. (unfounded speculation that employees of such churches “are overwhelmingly likely to
share their anti-contraception views”). See also, id. at 381 (unfounded speculation that many
employees of nonprofit religious organizations that are not churches do not share their employer’s
views on contraception).
For ease of reference, the cases are again collected here: Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
(Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which accommodates religious observance by
prison inmates, does not violate Establishment Clause); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
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third-party harm rule dismiss these cases because in their judgment the shift in cost
is too small or is diffused over an unidentifiable class. The commentators claim that
they are only concerned when the shift in cost is to an identifiable group of third
parties, as in Amos, Hobbie, and Hobby Lobby. Diffusion of the injury among many
might make a difference for legal doctrines like standing, but it is surely irrelevant
to the Establishment Clause. Again, the focus of the Clause is on whether the law in
question has transgressed the boundary between church and government. Either it
has or it has not; no balancing of harms and benefits. If it has cross the boundary, it
is outright unconstitutional. It is of no moment that the resulting burden falls on a
known class or is spread over a wide and diffuse population. Once again, the
proponents of the rule of third-party harm seem unaware of the implications of the
structural nature of the Establishment Clause.

CONCLUSION
In a half-dozen cases the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of a religious exemption as not violative of the Establishment Clause: Cutter, Amos,
Gillette, Walz, Zorach, The Selective Draft Law Cases. In some of these cases there
was burden-shifting to identifiable third parties, but the shift made no difference in
the Court’s application of the Establishment Clause. In the one case where the Court
did strike down a statute accommodating religion, Caldor, the offending legislation
created an absolute right to be accommodated, thereby compelling a private-sector
employer to act in conformity with a religious tenet of an employee. Within two years
of that holding, the Court twice took special care that Caldor be confined to its facts.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11. Neither RFRA nor RLUIPA
suffers from being an “unyielding” preference such that one in the private sector is
compelled by law to follow the religious practice of another.
RFRA/RLUIPA do not violate the Establishment Clause, either on their face or
as applied.
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CARL H. ESBECK
R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law Emeritus
483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exemption for religious employers in employment nondiscrimination act is not a
religious preference violative of Establishment Clause); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(religious exemption from military draft for those opposing all war does not violate Establishment
Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions for religious
organizations do not violate Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (local
public school district’s release of students from state compulsory education law to enable them to
attend religion classes off the public school grounds does not violate Establishment Clause); The
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military draft exemption for clergy, seminarians, and
pacifists does not violate Establishment Clause).
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